The Synoptic Gospel Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

The Synoptic Gospel - Essay Example Jesus also heard the Fathers voice. Luke records that Jesus saw the Holy spirit in the form of a dove, not in a dove-like fashion descending on Him (Luke 3:22).An audible revelation followed the visual one (v.17).Matthew recorded God’s word as a general announcement (cf.17:5).While the other evangelists recorded that God sais, â€Å"You are my beloved Son† (Mark1:11; Luke3:22).Evidently the accounts of Mark and Luke contain actual words of God in this event. The study of all the gospels the synoptic problem is inherent, essentially involving all the difficulties that arise out of the similarities and differences between the gospel accounts. The bible books of Matthew, Mark and Luke are termed as synoptic gospels because they present the life and ministry of Jesus Christ with similarities common in their narrative accounts. Part of the synoptic problem is in determining from what source the Holy Spirit led the evangelists in writing their gospels. This is because there is evidence within the individual gospels themselves that the writers used source materials as they wrote. The best example is the Old Testament passages to which each one of the writers referred to directly of indirectly. Amongst the disciples of Jesus were Matthew and John, who presented many eye-witness accounts of what happened. Likewise, their was a close connection between Mark and Peter, and Luke as well as being an historian was also closely connected with Paul(Luk e 1:1-4).Information that the writers obtained verbally could have been a source and perhaps special revelations from God. In the each for the source of the synoptic gospels, there were scholars who posited that the source was one. But other scholars thought the source of synoptic gospel to be from two sources. Some favored the view that the primary source must have been from Mark since over 90 percent of the material in Mark also appears in Matthew and or Luke. Others posited another primary source which is known as â€Å"Q†

LOCKE BY MICHAEL AYERS Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

LOCKE BY MICHAEL AYERS - Essay Example Locke's view on the 'idea' itself center on the fact that he makes no distinction between the intellect and the imagination. Therefore, Locke stood to believe that the idea was a sensory image which is why many researchers refer to him as an imagist. Locke explains an idea as "Whatever it is, which the mind can be employed about thinking" (p. 45). As a result, many have concluded that Locke meant to leave the definition ambiguous, perhaps to allow individuals to make their own decisions. Others believe that Locke was following the same philosophical lines as Gassendi, who used the word in a more fantastical theoretical framework. However, this conclusion is challenged, give the fact that Locke rarely used the words fantasy or fancy when discussing ideas. Yet Locke strongly encouraged people to refrain from thinking that their interpretation of objects and ideas were exactly as they appeared outside of the mind. He draws on the idea of the memory as a place to save, in a way, ideas, though, again, they are not perfect representations. Ayers uses the analogy of a bird and a song to explain this point. If the bird hears a song and then produces it the next day, people may tend to say the bird memorized the song. Locke would say that the bird saved the song in its mind to use to compare the song he is singing. Likewise, children think when they have something to think about. They produce their own mental images, but these images are not exactly like those they see. Thus, Locke's idea is a sensation that is saved through retention in the mind. Ayers claims that Locke was reluctant to apply any intellectual activity to these sensations. He did not separate the imagist mind from a higher, intellectual mind. He never saw a reason to do this, unlike other philosophers. Of course Locke recognized the existence of wit, judgment, wisdom, and madness but only in terms of what the person did with his existing ideas. Descartes and Locke debated the idea of separating conceiving an idea and imagining an idea as either the same or separate functions. Descartes argued that one can conceive of a particular shape but not image it since he does not know exactly what it looks like. Locke countered with the argument that if one can reason about the number of sides and lengths of the shape, we can imagine it from those existing ideas. Ayers concludes that this is an argument against not only Descartes but also the Cartesian views. Ayers notes that in Locke's discussion of abstract ideas, he seems to contradict himself. He says that ideas such as jealousy and lies cannot be imagined by the mind. This seems to suggest that Locke did recognize other conceptions of the mind. Locke later explained that these abstract concepts were ideas "partially considered" (Ayers, p. 49). Ayers final argument here in considering Locke an imagist lies within the idea of an intuition of universal truth or a priori knowledge. Ayers explains this idea using diagrams. He says that philosophers like Descartes say that understanding diagrams, charts, etc. occurs because of higher intellectual processes in the mind. Locke argues that these ideas on paper are representations or copies of what already exists in the mind. For example, a line or angle is something

Bourdieus Theory of Capital, Habitus and Field

Bourdieus Theory of Capital, Habitus and Field How Useful are Bourdieu’s Concept of Field, Habitus, and Capital for Understanding Contemporary Social Theory? Introduction Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) developed his theory of cultural capital, with Jean-Claude Passeron, as part of an attempt to explain differences in educational achievement according to social origin (Robbins, 2005: 22-24): to show ‘that social exclusion is a continuous process’ (Ibid. p 23). In his theory, the cultural and social forms of capital are based on, without being determined by, the amount of economic capital possessed and thus hide or mask the way in which social hierarchies are reproduced. The three forms of capital combine, and are embodied, to produce an individuals habitus, or set of predispositions, whilst the field refers to the arena in which a specific habitus is realised or deployed. For Bourdieu, then, the concepts of capital, field and habitus were ultimately embedded in relations of power (Burkett, 2004: 236) and were part of a complex theory that sought to explain the way that social inequality is reproduced. Many have debated the usefulness of Bourd ieu’s theory to contemporary research (see, for example, Fine in Burkett, 2004; Tooley and Darby in Nash, 1999), while others have debated the degree to which he drew on the founding fathers of sociology, with some concluding that his theory of practice is ‘strongly Weberian’ (Keyes, 2002: 233), or that his concepts draw on the work of Durkheim (Camic, 2000). Here I attempt to asses the degree to which he drew on Marx, Weber and Durkheim when constructing the key concepts of capital, field and habitus, and the usefulness or otherwise of them to contemporary research. In the first section, I outline Bourdieu’s concept of Capital, demonstrating its role within his overall theory before showing the key ways in which his usage differs from that of Marx. Next I examine the debate surrounding the use of the concept within contemporary political science, notably in the work of Robert Putnam (1995). In the second section, I examine Bourdieu’s concept of Habitus, demonstrating its role within his overall theory of cultural capital, before showing the key ways in which his usage differs from that of Durkheim and Weber. Next, I examine the usefulness of the term by examining the debate surrounding its use in educational research in the work of Diane Reay (1995). In the final section, I outline Bourdieu’s concept of the field, discussing its role within his overall theory before finally examining its usefulness to those undertaking feminist examinations of the way that power is experienced as differentiated, especially within the reprodu ction of patriarchy (McNay, 1999). In the conclusion, I attempt to assess the overall usefulness of Bourdieu’s key concepts to the social sciences, arguing that he raided the concepts of the founding father but without having any ideological commitment to them; that his usage reflected his focus on them as tools of practical research. That, however, it is this practical focus that may have contributed to the difficulty experienced by those who now seek clarification as to their meaning. The Forms of Capital In this section I outline Bourdieu’s concept of Capital, demonstrating its role within his overall theory before showing the key ways in which his usage differs from that of Marx. Finally, I examine the debate surrounding contemporary use of the concept within political science, notably in the work of Robert Putnam (1995). For Bourdieu capital can be divided into different forms: social capital, cultural capital and economic capital. By social capital he refers to the network of ‘useful relationships that can secure material or symbolic profits’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 249): the amount of social capital that an individual can draw upon is thus the sum of the number of people in their network and the amount of capital so possessed. Bourdieu further divides cultural capital into three forms: ‘embodied’, ‘objectified’ and ‘institutionalised’: embodied capital is imbued during socialisation, and is ultimately tied to the social location of the individual (Nash, 1999: 185). Embodied capital represents ‘external wealth converted into an integral part of the person’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 244-5). Objectified capital refers to goods or artefacts – including paintings and sculptures which ‘are defined only in the relationship with cultural capital in its embodied form’ (Bourdieu, 1986:246): in other words, the goods themselves and the ability to consume them. Institutionalised capital refers to those academic qualifications which enable an individual to directly convert between cultural and economic capital: ‘a certificate of cultural competence which confers on its holder a conventional, constant, legally guaranteed value with respect to culture’ (Bourdieu, 1986:248). Thus, the different forms of capital are based upon, but not determined by, economic capital. We can see that Bourdieu’s use of ‘capital’ is very different from that employed by Marx. Whereas K arl Marx (1818-1883) had paid little attention to the cultural sphere, believing it to be little more than ‘false consciousness’, Bourdieu sought to use the language of Marx and economic theory (Robbins, 2005: 20) to develop a ‘marxisant’ (Moi, 2000: 322) theory of culture. Like Marx, for Bourdieu capital has the capacity to reproduce ‘in identical or expanded form’ (Bourdieu, 1986:241), becoming part of the structure of society that enables and constrains individual’s lives (Bourdieu, 1986: 242). However, Bourdieu’s use of the term may therefore be viewed as being closer to power (Bourdieu, 1986: 243) than as it was used by Marx. In Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000)[1] Robert Putnam utilised the concept of social capital, transferring it from sociology into the realm of political science. Putnam argued that increasing individualism had led to the decline of community ties, political participation and therefore ‘good governance’ (Russell, 2005: 557). Putnam defined social capital as ‘features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1995: 67). However, Putnams’ definition is very different from Bourdieu’s; whereas for Bourdieu social capital was held by the individual (Walters, 2002: 387), for Putnam it is a collective capacity (Ibid. p. 379). Further, within Bourdieu’s conception it would be difficult to see how there could be a reduction in social capital. William Walters (2002) argues that Putnam’s use of the concept differs from Bourdieu’s in that whereas Bourdieu argued that social capital is transferable with economic capital but not reducible to it (Bourdieu, 1986: 243) Putnam’s use is more liberal; he assumes ‘a self-maximising individual for whom associative activity can, under certain circumstances, be an investment’ (Walters, 2002: 379). Ben Fine argues, convincingly, that academia has been gripped by a ‘social capital fetish’ (in Burkett, 2004: 234): that the concept has been so stretched as to render it meaningless (Burkett, 2004: 238). However, the weakening of Bourdieu’s concept of capital has occurred since his death, and so reflects on contemporary theorists and not on the usefulness or otherwise of the concept itself. Habit: Habitus The forms of capital as outlined above combine to produce a persons habitus, or set of predispositions: in this section I first provide a brief summary of the use of habit/ habitus in sociological thought, before next outlining Bourdieu’s use of the term. I examine the concepts role within his schema and demonstrate how his conception draws, but differs from, the work of Durkheim and Weber. Finally, I examine the debate surrounding the use of the concept in educational research, notably by Diane Reay (1995, in Nash, 1999). Charles Camic (200) describes how the term habit was extensively used by the Ancient Greeks, and medieval scholars and theologians. During the 18th century it continued to be used by Enlightenment thinkers as diverse as Helvà ©tius, Acquinus, Rousseau and Kant (Camic, 2000: 329; Nash, 1999: 180-182) to describe a range of behaviour from those ‘virtually automatic’ actions to ‘more involved patterns of conduct’ (Camic, 2000: 327). W ithin the work of Durkheim the term assumed a central importance, concerned as he was with the development of the collective conscience, or secular moral code (Camic, 2000: 334). For Durkheim human action could be divided into two poles, with ‘reflection on the one side, and that of habit on the other side, with the latter pole being the stronger’ (Durkheim in Camic, 2000: 333). For Durkheim primary education was therefore benign, for here the child can be imbued with ‘the habitual basis of social morality’ (Camic, 2000: 33). Yet despite this assertion of the central role of habit in the social world, Durkheim assigned the study of it to psychology, and not sociology (Camic, 2000: 337). However, for Bourdieu social inequality, or differential access to the forms of capital, becomes part of the very bodies and predispositions of the individual via the habitus (McNay, 1999: 99). Marx argued that ‘men make their own history, but [†¦] they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past’ (Marx, 1852, quoted in Coates, 1990: 265): for Bourdieu, the individual is constrained by the amount and quality of cultural, economic and social capital that they possess: it is ‘discrimination embodied as dispositions’ (Nash, 1999: 177), it is thus a sociological concern. Further, whereas Durkheim’s conscience collective sought to explain the way in which meaning is given to emotional experiences (Shilling, 1997: 204) and so focuses on the collective, for Bourdieu the habitus is a possession of the individual (Nash, 1999: 182). For Weber, ‘custom’ designated that range of behaviour that is the ‘unreflective, set disposition to engage in actions that have been long practiced’ (Camic, 2000: 337): being both conformity with and the generator of social norms (Camic, 2000: 338). This is similar to Bourdieu’s ‘sociology of practice’: following Weber, Bourdieu believes that the purpose of the social sciences is to explain action, yet where Weber was more interested in the ‘larger social and cultural conditions under which general societal patterns of habitual action wax and wane’ (Camic, 2000: 341), Bourdieu remains tied to the individual, actual, practical affects of power and history (Bourdieu in Nash, 1999: 179). For Weber, habit falls at the border of meaningful action, and therefore outside of sociology (Camic, 2000: 345), for Bourdieu it is precisely the doxic nature of habit that renders it socially important. Diane Reay (1995) used habitus as a method when conducting fieldwork in the classroom (in Nash, 1999). For Weber, an ideal type is ‘a construct developed to make sense out of a chaos of facts’ (Keyes, 2002: 240). Likewise, for Bourdieu habitus helps us to make sense of ‘that part of practices which remains obscure in the eyes of their own producers’ (Bourdieu in Keyes, 2002: 240): it is a conceptual tool, something to ‘think with’ (Nash, 1999: 185). Roy Nash (1999) charts the difficulties that arise, when such a conceptual tool is utilised in practical research, but concludes that it is ‘worthwhile, just because to do so forces one to think’ (Nash, 1999: 185): the habitus ‘offers explanations’ (Nash, 1999: 185), by examining whether the habitus can explain social differences in education we have gained a deeper understanding of these inequalities. The concept of habit had previously been a ‘staple’ of weste rn social thought, from medieval times to the thought of Weber and Durkheim, but fell outside of sociology and into psychology due to the scramble to assert disciplinary boundaries (Camic, 2000: 355); Bourdieu sought to revive the concept as part of his search for concepts which would aid our understanding of the limits to individual action: it is ‘a conceptual tool for comprehending that the capacity to project forwards which people really posses is understandable as a function of their prior social condition rather than in terms of abstract mathematical models’ (Robbins, 2005: 26). In other words, habitus allows Bourdieu to mediate between agency and structure without relying on the atomised, rational individual of liberalism, instead situating the actor within extant power relations. The Field In the final section I outline Bourdieu’s concept of the field, discussing its role within his overall theory before finally examining its usefulness to those undertaking feminist examinations of the reproduction of patriarchy (McNay, 1999). The ‘field’ refers to the arena, or social context, in which a specific habitus may be realised; knowledge regarding the use of particular machinery may be of little use in the world of show jumping, but of uppermost importance to those involved in car manufacture. Likewise, maintaining a network of engineers would be of little use to those outside this specific field: society in total constitutes a field, and is ‘structured according to relations of domination’ (Peillon, 1998: 215), but also society is comprised by a range of distinct fields: Fields will vary according to how much autonomy they acquire from the entirety of the social field. An autonomous field is characterised by a high level of specificity: it possesses its own history; a particular configuration of agents operate within it and struggle for a distinctive stake; it induces its own habitus and upholds a distinctive set of beliefs. Such an autonomous field is highly differentiated and marked by sharp boundaries, beyond which the field ceases to have any impact on practice (Peillon, 1998: 215). Bourdieu recognised that academia is such a field and therefore is embedded in and reflects social relations. For Bourdieu, then, the field refers to the different arenas or social spaces in which capital is deployed or the habitus acts: ‘the embodied potentialities of the habitus are only ever realized in the context of a specific field’ (McNay, 1999: 109), further, each field is distinct and therefore operates according to its own logic (McNay, 1999: 114): knowledge of sociological theory would be of little use to our aforementioned show jumper. As it is deployed, therefore, habitus is both determined and generative as it is able to constitute the field from which it emerges (McNay, 1999:100); it is the ‘feel for the game’ that also reproduces the game (Bourdieu, 1990: 52) as each individual is positioned within the field by their possession of specific types of capital and their strategies so contribute to its reproduction. When comparing Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the field with that of Foucault’s work on the body, Lois McNay (1999) finds that Bourdieu’s is the more developed as he is better able to theorize the differentiated nature of the constraints which act to limit the individuals ability to create their own identity (McNay, 1999: 95). For McNay, Bourdieu’s concept of the field is useful within feminist theory when considering the differences within women’s experiences of gender, as well as those differences between men and women (McNay, 1999: 114): ‘as a relational concept the field yields an understanding of society as a differentiated and open structure and provides a framework in which to conceptualise the uneven and non-systematic ways in which subordination and autonomy are realized’ (McNay, 1999: 115, my emphasis). For example, in relation to the production of knowledge this might explain the early marginalization of much feminist resear ch and the way it was the thought of a particular group of women – white, heterosexual, middle class women – that came to dominate second wave feminism, as opposed to the feminisms of other groups: in short, Bourdieu’s concept of the field enables us to consider the way that power is not a monolithic concept but is experienced differentially. Conclusion In conclusion, when assessing the overall usefulness of Bourdieu’s key concepts to contemporary research and theory it is important not to forget the intention of Bourdieu himself: Bourdieu intended capital, habitus and the field to be tools used to aid such empirical research (Peillon, 1998: 241) and not as constituent parts of a ‘grand theory’: he had no interest in ‘speculative philosophy’ (Robbins, 2005: 15). Bourdieus’ theory has been criticized as being essentialist and deterministic, however others have embraced its potential to explain the way in which such social inequality is reproduced (such as Reay, 1995 in Nash, 1999). Derek Robbins argues that Bourdieu had ‘no sympathy for the mystery of Durkheim’s conscience collective’ but was enough a product of the ‘Durkheimian legacy’ to wish to encourage a future society based on the positive unity of equality (Robbins, 2005: 19). For Robbins then, Bourdieu: regarded the discourses of the sciences as contrived language games which are alienated from natural culture. This did not cause him to be reductive or sceptical but it did cause him to deploy these discourses, varying them imaginatively, so as to isolate essences which are contingently changeable socially, geographically and historically (Robbins, 2005: 20). In other words, the language of the sciences were the tools that Bourdieu used in his practical attempt to construct a fairer world. However, it is this practical focus of his concepts that may have contributed to the difficulty experienced by those who now seek clarification as to their meaning, as he had varied their meaning to aid understanding of the particular instance under scrutiny. Having drawn on the work of the founding fathers of sociology – Marx, Durkheim, Weber – he felt no ideological commitment to these concepts, but instead felt free to move between discourses to better understand (Robbins, 2005: 20). Thus the concept of habit and/ or habitus that had been a ‘staple’ concept in western social thought, (Camic, 2000: 355) which Bourdieu sought to revive as part of his search for concepts which would aid our understanding of the limits to individual action. Keyes argues that Bourdieu’s use of habitus is as a Weberian ‘ideal typeâ⠂¬â„¢ (2002: 239), I argue that his use of capital and the field are as similar ‘ideal types’. His concept of capital may have been weakened, as Ben Fine argues, by academia’s subsequent stretching (Burkett, 2004: 238), however this weakening occurred after his death, and so should not reflect negatively on the usefulness of the concept. Indeed, it is this flexibility that renders it an appropriate tool. Finally, his notion of the field is useful when considering the differentiated affects of power: Bourdieu remains good to ‘think with’ (Nash, 1999: 185). Bibliography Bourdieu, Pierre (1990) The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bourdieu, Pierre (1986) ‘The forms of Capital’, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, Richardson, J (Ed.), London: Greenwood Press, pp241-258. Burkett, Paul (2001) ‘Book Review: Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium’ by Ben Fine, London: Routledge, Historical Materialism, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 233-246. Camic, Charles (2000) ‘The Matter of Habit’, Pierre Bourdieu: Volume One, Robbins, Derek (Ed.), London: Sage, pp. 323-366. Coates, D (1990) ‘Traditions of Social Thought’, Social and Cultural Forms of Modernity, Anderson, J Ricci, M (Eds.), Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Keyes, Charles F. (2002) ‘Weber and Anthropology’, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 31, pp. 233-255. McNay, Lois (1999) ‘Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity’, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 95-117. Moi, Toril (2000[1991]) ‘Appropriating Bourdieu: Feminist Theory and Pierre Bourdieu’s Sociology of Culture’, Pierre Bourdieu: Volume IV, Robbins, Derek (Ed.), London: Sage, pp. 314-341. Nash, Roy (1999) ‘Bourdieu, Habitus, and Educational Research: Is it all Worth the Candle?’, British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 175-187. Peillon, Michel (1998) ‘Bourdieu’s Field and the Sociology of Welfare’, Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 213-229. Putnam, Robert (1995) ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, An Interview with Robert Putnam’ in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 65-78. Robbins, Derek (2005) ‘The Origins, Early Development and Status of Bourdieus Concept of ‘Cultural Capital’’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 13-30. Russell, Andrew (2005) ‘Political Parties as Vehicles of Political Engagement’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 555-569. Shilling, Chris (1997) ‘Emotions, Embodiment and the Sensation of Society’, The Sociological Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 195-219. Walters, William (2002) ‘Social Capital and Political Sociology: Re-imagining Politics?’ Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 377-397. Footnotes [1] New York, N.Y.: Simon Schuster.

Causes of Sexual Dysfunctions Essay -- Biology Essays Research Papers

Causes of Sexual Dysfunctions "Sexual dysfunctions are an important public health concern, to which general health and emotional problems contribute" (10). What is a sexual dysfunction? A sexual dysfunction is any condition that inhibits someone's ability to enjoy sex. Some common sexual dysfunctions are: hypoactive desire disorder (low sex drive), hyperactive sexual disorder (high sex drive), sexual aversion disorder, lack of lubrication (females), impotence (male erectile disorder), premature ejaculation, vaginismus (prolonged contractions of the vaginal wall that cause painful intercourse), or failure to orgasm during sex (8). In a study of happily married couples, 14% of men and 15% of women reported that they were either not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with their sex lives. In another study by Laumann in 1992, it was found that the prevalence of sexual dysfunction is 43% in women and 31% in men (10). Are these numbers surprising? What is causing this lack of sexual fulfillment? Did you ever wonder why sexual desire varies from person to person? Or why and how your sexual drive can change over time? Did you ever wonder what causes things to go wrong sexually - sexual dysfunctions? What is controlling YOUR sexual desire? Innervations of the organs of sexuality are mediated primarily through the autonomic nervous system (12). The autonomic nervous system is the part of the vertebrate nervous system that regulates involuntary action, as of the intestines, heart, and glands, and that is divided into the sympathetic nervous system and the parasympathetic nervous system (1). It is generally assumed that the parasympathetic system activates the process of erection via impulses that pass through the pelvic splan... ... 4) HEAD INJURY AND SEXUALITY http://www.medlit.net/guests/Abstracts/Head-inj.htm 5)EMOTIONAL MEMORY AND THE AMYGDALA http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~shamann/amygdala.html 6)Kluver-Bucy Syndrome http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gjdlab/Dar.html 7)Limbic System http://www.placidity.net/neuro/page/11sect/0.shtml 8)Sexual Dysfunction http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/andyf/teaching/clinical/sexdysfunction.pdf 9)Sex and states of consciousness http://www.innerworlds.50megs.com/sex_ascs.htm 10)Sexual Dysfunction Secondary to Depressive Disorders http://www.mmhc.com/jgsm/articles/JGSM9904/bartlik.html 11)What causes behavior? http://www.science.mcmaster.ca/Psychology/psych2f03/lecture11.doc 12)Sexual Dysfunction Following Injury:Time for Enlightenment and Understanding http://www.neuroskills.com/index.html?main=tbi/sex-discussion.shtml

Ucla Econ 101 Final Spring 2011

1 Final Exam (VERSION 1): Econ 101 †¢ Please write your name at the top of every page of this mideterm †¢ Please write your name, TA’s name, and the time of your discussion section here Your Name: TA’s Name: Discussion Time: †¢ The exam has one parts: Written Questions. †¢ There should be 16 total pages (front and back). Quickly read through the exam before beginning. †¢ There are 100 total points available. Point values are listed next to each problem part. Please allocate your time accordingly 1 2 Written Questions 1. Consider the following payo? matrix Player L M T 2, 0 3, 1 Player 1 C 3, 4 1, 2 B 1, 3 0, 2 2 R 4,2 2,3 3,0 . (5pnts) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the simultaneous game b. (5pnts) Now suppose the game is played sequentially. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium if player 1 goes ? rst and if player 2 goes ? rst. c. (5pnts) Discuss whether each of the players would want to go ? rst or second. d. (5pnts) Write down a sy stem of equations such that the solution to the system would give a completely mixed strategy equilibrium of this game (please clearly de? ne all of your notation). Can this system of equations be solved? (Hint: think about the condition requiring player 1 to play B with positive probability).Explain what the answer means. 2 WORK SPACE 3 WORK SPACE 4 2. Suppose Player 1 and Player 2 are playing a simultaneous move game with the following payo? matrix: Player 2 L R T 0, 4 ? , 3 Player 1 B 3, 3 4, 6 where ? ? 0 a. (5pnts) De? ne a dominant strategy equilibrium. Is there any value of ? for which there is a dominant strategy equilibrium. If so, ? nd the values of ?. If not, show why. b. (5pnts) Describe all the pure and mixed strategy equilibria of the game as a function of ? c. (5pnts) Suppose ? = 5. What would the outcome be if the players could cooperate? 5 WORK SPACE 6 WORK SPACE 7 3.Billy has just inherited a horse ranch from his uncle. The ranch is located in Oshkosh, WI and rents horses. A unique feature of the stable is the nearby riding trails that overlook Lake Winnebago. Billy has two types of potential customers: novice riders (N) and serious riders (S). The (per customer) demand for horse rides on the ranch is qS = 75 ? 1. 25PS , where qS is the number of hourlong rides a serious rider makes per year. The demand for novice riders is qN = 57 ? 1. 25PN . Assume there are 75 riders of each type in the town. Billy’s cost function is T C = 12q, where q is the total number of hours the horses are ridden per year. . (5pnts) Suppose Billy does not price discriminate. Find prices, quantities, and Billy’s pro? t. b. (5pnts) Suppose Billy can tell who’s a serious rider because of the types of hat they ware. Find the 3rd degree price discriminating prices, quantities and pro? ts. c. (5pnts) Suppose Billy is not able to tell the di? erence between the two types of rider. He decides to start charging a yearly membership fee, T , as well as an h ourly price, p. Find the optimal choices of T and p d. (5pnts) Suppose Billy IS able to tell the di? erence between the two types of but still thinks the 2-part tari? is a good idea.Find the annual fee and per hour price that Billy would charge to each group 8 WORK SPACE 9 WORK SPACE 10 4. (16pnts) Boeing and Airbus are the 2 ? rms that produce commercial aircraft. The demand for airplanes is given by: Q = 10 ? P . Boeing’s costs are given by T CB = cB qB and Airbus’ costs are given by: T CA = cA qA where cA , cB are constants. a. (5pnts) Find the Cournot quantities, prices and pro? ts. Find Stackelberg quantities, prices, and pro? ts assuming Boeing chooses output ? rst b. (5pnts) Suppose that right now cB = cA = 5. Boeing has access to a process innovation that will lower marginal costs from 5 to 0.How much would Boeing be willing to invest to implement the innovation. (Assume Cournot Competition from here on) c. (5pnts) Suppose that the innovation is such that Airbu s can (imperfectly) copy it, so if Boeing makes the investment Airbus’ costs fall to 2. How much is Boeing willing to pay now? d. (5pnts) If Airbus can perfectly copy the innovation, how much would Boeing be willing to pay? Why is Boeing willing to pay a positive amount? 11 WORK SPACE 12 WORK SPACE 13 5. There are two types of people in the world Sky Divers and Cat People. Both types have wealth W = 100 and utility functions U (W ) = ln(W ).Both types of people can have an accident that leads them to lose $50 of wealth. Sky Divers are riskier and have accidents 75% of the time, while Cat People have accidents only 25% of the time. The proportion of Sky Divers in the economy is pS and the proportion of Cat People is pC = 1 ? pS a. (5pnts) How much would each type be willing to pay for an insurance policy that fully reimbursed them in the event of an accident? b. (5pnts) Write down the equations that, if you solved them, would give the amount each type would be willing to pay f or insurance that covered half their losses? . (5pnts) What is the fair price of (full) insurance for each type (i. e. if an insurer knows which type he is dealing with)? What is the fair price if the insurer cannot distinguish the two types? d. (5pnts) Assume insurers cannot distinguish the two types and that insurance markets are competitive so prices are the fair prices. Describe prices and who is insured in equilibrium as a function of pS e. (5pnts) Discuss the meaning of adverse selection in the context of this example 14 WORK SPACE 15 WORK SPACE 16

Leading marines

Identify the author's mission (task and purpose) in writing this book. The author's purpose in writing this book was to explain the role of the ‘leader' in the Marine Corps. To accomplish this the author used examples of corps values, ethos, individual courage and unit spirit. 2. What part of the book was the most effective in accomplishing the author's mission? What part of the book was the least effective? The part of the book that I think is most effective at accomplishing the author's mission is chapter three: Challenges. Friction dominates war, it makes simple tasks hard'. The author touches on how friction affects us anywhere from the marine-air- ground task force down to the most forward fghting positions and how getting over the brick wall that is adversity is key to being able to lead marines. 3. What does the author assume to be true in order to accomplish his mission? Does the author validate these assumptions in the book? The author really shows the importance of th e lessons we learned in boot camp and OCS as the basis of what is needed to accomplish any mission.The author validates these assumptions as he goes back to what we learned in training as xamples of how we should carry ourselves as leaders and Marines. 4. The part of the book that is most relevant to what I / we do is: The part of the book that is most relevant to what â€Å"we do is chapter three. The author talks about Friction and overcoming challenges in everyday life such as physical challenge and the importance of being combat effective. This is relevant to me because I think physical fitness is key to anyone in the Marine Corps who wants to be a leader. . Identify the author's specific and implied conclusions. What I took as an implied conclusion was that there's a bigger purpose for veryone and you won't know what that purpose is unless you take risks to find that purpose. What part ot the book was the most ettective in accomplishing the author's The part of the book that i s most relevant to what l/we do is chapter three. The ground task torce down to the most torward tgnting positions and now getting over purpose. 1.Identify the author's mission (task and purpose) in writing this book. ground task force down to the most forward fighting positions and how getting over The part ot the book that is most relevant to what I / we do is: 6a. With respect to the author's conclusions (either specified or implied), I / we ccept or agree with the following: I agree with the implied conclusion that the fundamentals of leading marines is engraved in each of us as marines in boot camp or OCS and that those fundamentals are the basis of being a leader and a Marine. b. With respect to the author's conclusions (either specified or implied), I / we reject or do not agree with the following: There was nothing that I did not agree with. 7a. This book made a favorable impression on me and it will change the way I approach: This book will definitely make me think back to the basics when I am approached with adversity.